“…USAID mostly paid lip service to counternarcotics, rather than being an active participant. They gave the feeling they didn’t want to be in the photograph when the picture was taken…” 

WHEN THE TRUTH COMES OUT

TAKING A SECOND LOOK AT THE TRUE DRUG LORDS AND ENABLERS OF THE SPREAD OF ILLICIT HEROIN

President Trump’s trade war with China, Canada, and Mexico is intertwined with his accusations of these countries’ failures to curb the flow of fentanyl into the United States.  

Trump imposed tariffs, claiming China subsidizes fentanyl precursor chemicals while acknowledging that Complex and China have taken some steps to address it. Despite some progress, the acetyl-fentanyl crisis remains a significant problem. Decades of drug war tactics have failed, merely shifting the production of fentanyl precursors from China to India, Myanmar, and other parts of Southeast Asia.

The provided article examines the multifaceted opioid crisis, exploring its complex international dimensions and the rise of multiple artificial intelligences (AIs) and predictive analytics that has transformed American law enforcement into a highly sophisticated system of surveillance and control, disproportionately targeting Black and Brown communities.

“..In 2017, poppy cultivation alone was estimated to provide up to 590,000 full-time-equivalent jobs, more than the number of people employed by the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces..” 

These data-driven approaches, justified as crime prevention, have instead functioned as tools for wealth extraction, enriching the legal class structure at the expense of marginalized populations.  While for multiple years the US, DEA, and the international public are increasingly focused on prescription opioids and medical professionals as the source of the opioid crisis in the United States.

Sources detailed the Trump administration’s trade war tactics against China, Canada, and Mexico, framed within accusations of insufficient fentanyl control. 

Yet another, “The SIGAR Report,” criticizes the U.S. government’s role in Afghanistan’s opium production, alleging complicity with warlords and a contradictory approach to domestic and international drug policy.

“…Afghanistan produced 90 percent of the world’s illicit opium; it is the country’s largest export and a mainstay of the rural economy. The corruption associated with opium’s illegal trade permeates many levels of the Afghan government.

Yet, counternarcotics was of necessity only one of many priorities for the U.S. reconstruction effort in Afghanistan. That effort comprised a number of different agencies, each with its own view of what was important, its own mandate and budget, and its own reporting lines to Congress and the White House.

This was often a competitive environment, where agencies battled for resources to pursue what were, or were often perceived to be, conflicting objectives and programs…” (pg. 40)

—Doug Wankel, former director of the Kabul Counter Narcotics Task Force, U.S. Embassy Kabul 

 This report from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) examines the U.S. counternarcotics effort in Afghanistan from 2002-2017. The report analyzes four key approaches: interdiction and law enforcement, eradication, alternative development, and efforts to mobilize Afghan political support.

SIGAR found that while some tactical successes were achieved, strategic goals largely remained unmet, due to factors including inconsistent strategies, weak data, corruption, and a lack of integration with broader security and development goals.

The report offers thirteen recommendations to improve future counternarcotics efforts, emphasizing better data collection, more effective coordination among U.S. agencies, and stronger alignment with Afghan priorities.

A Third source focuses on a lawsuit against CVS, accusing the company of illegal opioid dispensing. 

The complaint alleges that CVS routinely filled invalid prescriptions for controlled substances, violating the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) and the False Claims Act (FCA).  

Numerous examples of specific drugs and prescribers involved in the alleged illegal activity are provided as evidence. 

Finally, the texts discuss the challenges of combating the crisis, highlighting the limitations of current strategies and emphasizing the need for improved international cooperation and data-driven approaches.

“…From fiscal year (FY) 2002 through FY 2017, the U.S. government allocated approximately $8.62 billion for counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. This included more than $7.28 billion for programs with a substantial counternarcotics focus and $1.34 billion for programs that included a counternarcotics component. (8) (See page 20.)….

….Yet, drug production and trafficking remain entrenched. Afghanistan is the world’s largest opium producer, and opium poppy is the country’s largest cash crop, with an estimated annual export value of $1.5 to $3 billion in recent years…”  JUNE 2018 | 1

DOJ-DEA WEAPONIZING MEDICAL HEALTHCARE IN AMERICA

As in previous presentations, this article more than demonstrates that our work in youarewithinthenorms.com has been correct,

“that Medical professionals in the US (with ongoing concerns about the supply chain and the need for further international cooperation) were never the causative factor of the so-called opioid crisis, and they knew it…as they were just easier enforcement targets.”  

“…Opium production has also generated investments in the agricultural sector, such as in herbicides, fertilizers, tractors, diesel pumps, and solar panels.(20)

….The income farmers have earned from opium has been used for maintaining food security and agricultural production, as well as investing in businesses, education for family members, vehicles, and homes for those with land and capital, thereby transforming the rural economy…”(21)

“…The labor-intensive nature of opium production has also boosted the daily wages of those harvesting the crop, as well as those working in other sectors in opium poppy-growing areas….(22)

…These benefits are not limited to the rural economy; urban areas also saw increases in wage labor rates and a construction boom that was attributed to both the international aid and opium economies...”

THE FORT BRAGG CARTEL

Immediately after the US invasion, the DEA/CIA teamed up with many of the same narco-warlords who had been involved in the drug trade before 2001 as part of the Northern Alliance.

THE AFGHAN OPIUM ECONOMY

The US-backed government then legalized poppy cultivation. Within a year, heroin production returned to pre-Taliban levels, and Afghanistan became the world’s largest producer, supplying 1,000 metric tons of pure heroin each year for two decades – double the global demand.

According to the SIGAR Report;

” poppy cultivation, opium production, and drug trafficking are (were) supposedly illegal in Afghanistan. Opium is elemental, however, to the domestic economy. It is the country’s most valuable cash crop, with an estimated annual export value of $1.5 to $3 billion in recent years.

“…Opium production has also generated investments in the agricultural sector, such as in herbicides, fertilizers, tractors, diesel pumps, and solar panels...”

This single U.S. Foreign Policy in support of the Afghanistan is what precipitating the illicit Opioid Crisis which led to the increase availability of heroin worldwide and specifically in the United States of America.

The US-backed Afghan government at all levels and in every geographic region was deeply involved in the drug trade. This analysis raises serious questions about US foreign policy, its motives, and the human costs of its actions. Seth Harp’s forthcoming book, “The Fort Brag Cartel,” delves into U.S. DEA-DOJ and Department of State cooperation and provides a more complete picture of these issues.

Harp’s analysis challenges conventional narratives and suggests a deep and sustained involvement by the US government and its allies in fostering and profiting from the opium trade, with significant consequences for both Afghanistan and the global drug market.

The US government’s actions in Afghanistan highlight a discrepancy between its domestic anti-drug policies and its international actions. While enforcing strict penalties/long term prison sentences on medical providers, pain suffering patients, drug users and traffickers within the United States, the government sanctioned, funded and supported a large-scale drug trafficking operation in Afghanistan. 

Following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban’s return to power, poppy cultivation in Helmand Province has reportedly dropped by 99%. This dramatic decrease is a repeat of a similar eradication effort by the Taliban in 2001 before the US invasion. 

This suggests that the US-backed government was at least tacitly supporting opium production. The current situation allows for a clearer view of who was indeed responsible for the drug production during the 20 years of US presence, revealing that it was not the Taliban.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY PROVIDED BACK DOOR SUPPORT PROMOTING AFGHANISTAN’S PRODUCTION OF HEROIN & DISTRIBUTION WORLDWIDE

This United States Institute of Peace publication analyzes the impact of the Taliban’s opium ban in Afghanistan. Data indicates a significant decrease in opium poppy cultivation, largely replaced by wheat. 

The study highlights discrepancies in cultivation estimates between different organizations, emphasizing the importance of accurate data.

 However, the ban is expected to worsen rural poverty and potentially lead to political instability if it continues. The author of this study William Byrd senior expert, working on Afghanistan suggests that rural development, not just aid, is essential for long-term success in combating opium production.

The analysis also warns that either maintaining or relaxing the ban presents significant risks for the Taliban regime and the Afghan population.

Understanding the Implications of the Taliban’s Opium Ban in Afghanistan

Thursday, December 12, 2024

By: William Byrd, Ph.D.

“The Taliban’s opium ban, coupled with Afghan farmers’ replacement of poppy largely with low-value wheat, is likely to worsen dissatisfaction and political tensions. The Taliban’s persistence in enforcing the ban has been notable, especially in 2024. If the ban remains in place, it would demonstrate the regime’s strength but also worsen rural poverty, increase dissatisfaction among landholders and spur political instability.

This will likely lead to increased humanitarian needs and more pressures for outmigration to nearby countries and beyond, both of which are of interest to the U.S. and other Western countries.

Conversely, if the ban weakens in response to pressures and resistance, a revival of widespread poppy cultivation could undermine the regime’s authority. Aid alone will not offset the economic shock of the ban, nor stimulate the long-term growth needed to effectively combat the opium problem.”

“…Understanding the roles of different socioeconomic groups that participate in poppy cultivation is critical for developing effective and sustainable interventions.

As William Byrd and Doris Buddenberg noted, the varying levels of household dependency on opium and different ways they benefit from the crop imply “that there is diversity in households’ responses to shocks like elimination of opium poppy cultivation.”91 Counternarcotics efforts, such  as crop eradication, have had unintended effects, including local economic contraction and increased poverty. Coercive measures have also resulted in poppy cultivation being pushed to other geographic areas, or even intensified.

According to some analysts, such measures have increased support for the Taliban and other anti-government elements.92 Counternarcotics programs that ignore local variations and do not account for the reasons why certain groups participate in poppy cultivation run the risk of being ineffective or counterproductive.93..” 

EASING THE TALIBAN’S POPPY BAN

“…As concern over the scale of poppy cultivation grew, Ambassador Khalilzad and others reportedly told USAID to focus on alternative development.266. The pressure in these years was such that, between 2005 and 2008, USAID allocated an average of 75 percent of its total agricultural program budget for Afghanistan to alternative development.267 …..

….In 2005, USAID launched three large rural development programs: Alternative Development Program (ADP) North, ADP East, and ADP South, with a total of $332.78 million in funding.268 A fourth program, ADP Southwest, was launched in 2008….

….Despite USAID’s increased expenditures, some officials within the U.S. government expressed doubts that these alternative development projects would reduce opium poppy cultivation, as well as concerns about USAID’s…”     (pg 47)

“WE HAVE BEEN RUN-A-MUCK AND FLAT OUT DECEIVED,” THESE WEREN’T DOCTORS; THESE WERE GOVERNMENTS AND GEO-POLITICAL FOREIGN POLICIES

President Trump’s trade war with China, Canada, Panama and Mexico is intertwined with his accusations of these countries’ failures to curb the flow of fentanyl into the United States.  Trump imposed tariffs, claiming China subsidizes fentanyl precursor chemicals while acknowledging that the problem is complex and that China has taken some steps to address it. Despite some progress, the fentanyl crisis remains a significant problem.

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION 

“…that “..Lieutenant General David Barno, the commander of Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan, was reluctant to pursue counternarcotics efforts.227 Barno himself recalled “an infinite number of different things that people wanted us [the coalition military] to do” in 2004, and his decision to take “any direct military role in counternarcotics right off the plate, because I thought that would be a distraction for us in 2004, especially with the elections.” The main effort Barno assigned to military units was to “set conditions for a successful Afghan presidential election” in 2005…(228) 

“…The CIA adopted a similar position; it did not want to be distracted by counternarcotics.229 The CIA instead prioritized its relationships with significant traffickers, such as Haji Bashir Noorzai and Haji Juma Khan.230..” 

However, the US-backed Afghan government at all levels and in every geographic region was deeply involved in the drug trade. Major warlords in the government, such as Fahim Khan and Ahmed Wali Karzai, were well-known narcotics traffickers. The CIA-DEA had close relationships with them. Drug trafficking was common knowledge, pervasive throughout the Afghan government, and was directly supported by the DEA and other US governmental bodies.

The U.S. also deployed DEA FAST teams, composed of agents trained to conduct military-style raids alongside Afghan and U.S. forces. Early eradication efforts focused on manual eradication and a controversial program of compensated eradication, which was criticized for fueling corruption.

“…DOD was unwilling to be involved in counternarcotics efforts at this point, believing counternarcotics interfered with DOD’s mandate to defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda.225 A former senior DOD official recounted, “DOD fundamentally didn’t understand what getting involved in counternarcotics entailed.

Everyone was focusing on traditional roles. They would only talk to those in their battlespace. From a DOD perspective, it was tactical, and about finding and killing al-Qaeda.”226 Several officials interviewed by SIGAR recalled…” 

However, the Author of this Article is Brazen Bladen, United States Department of Justice and Drug Enforcement Administration (D.E.A.) Judicial Corruption.  Interdiction aimed to disrupt the drug trade by seizing drugs, destroying labs, arresting traffickers, and disrupting financial networks.

This strategy relied heavily on building the capacity of Afghan counternarcotics law enforcement units like the National Interdiction Unit (NIU) and specialized units within the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA).

Later, the U.S. favored forced eradication by creating the Afghan Eradication Force (AEF), later renamed the Poppy Eradication Force (PEF).

Despite significant investment, eradication efforts had a limited impact on reducing poppy cultivation and often generated resentment among farmers. The U.S. also considered aerial spraying, which was met with strong opposition from the Afghan government and international partners.

” From 2013 to 2016, drug production continued at or near the highest levels ever consistently seen in Afghanistan. The 2013 U.S. Civilian-Military Strategic Framework for Afghanistan included only a passing reference to counternarcotics, with no mention of eradication or interdiction. State continued to operate under its 2012 strategy, but neither State’s nor DOD’s efforts appeared to appreciably dampen narcotics production and trade.”

China’s role in the crisis remains a contention, with accusations of insufficient action contrasted by claims of significant efforts to curb production and distribution. Ultimately, the articles explore the multifaceted challenges of combating the opioid crisis within a broader geopolitical context.

“…Policy disagreements between INL and USAID over the effectiveness of making development assistance contingent on reductions in poppy cultivation added to USAID’s apprehension about being too closely involved in counternarcotics…

…There was concern that “if USAID’s programs were seen as merely the spearhead of a poppy eradication campaign, it would undermine [USAID’s] efforts to build the trust with local communities needed to effectively provide development assistance…”(271) 

Historical Context of Afghan Opium Production 

“…For centuries, opium poppy has been grown in the region known as the Golden Crescent, stretching across Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. During King Mohammed Zahir Shah’s reign from 1933 to 1973, the ruling family controlled the Afghan opium trade and largely exported it to Iran.37 After Zahir Shah was dethroned in a 1973 coup, Afghanistan slid into a period of unrest and conflict that endures today…. 

….The 1979–1989 Soviet occupation crippled the Afghan economy and created an environment where illicit activity and criminal networks flourished. The war devastated the Afghan countryside, destroying irrigated land and smothering agricultural output. Millions of Afghans fled the country, while many who remained turned to poppy cultivation, since poppies required little water and could grow in poor agricultural conditions.(38)

….From 1984 to 1985, Afghan opium production was estimated to more than double, from 140 to 400 metric tons, and in 1986, doubled again.39 Rebel mujahedeen forces, backed
by the United States and Pakistan, relied on revenue from poppy cultivation and opium production to fund their operations against the Soviets.(40)…” 

dea-doj photo-op AND THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS UNDERMINING OF RUAN

The Supreme Court case Ruan v. United States addresses the mens rea requirement for physicians charged with unlawfully distributing controlled substances. The central question was whether the government must prove a doctor knew they were prescribing unauthorized prescriptions to secure a conviction under 21 U.S.C. §841. 

The Demonization of Healthcare Providers such as Dr. Christopher Russ, MD., Dr. Lesly Pompy, MD., Dr. Neail Anand, MD., Barbara Marino, MD., the youarewithinthenorms.com has highlighted how doctors prescribing opioid medications are portrayed as “drug dealers” and subjected to aggressive prosecution based on flawed metrics like “overprescribing” and “red flags.”

The Court determined that the “knowingly or intentionally” mental state in the law applies to the “except as authorized” clause. Once a doctor offers proof their actions were authorized, the government must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt the doctor was aware they were acting in an unauthorized manner. 

Justice Alito’s concurrence disagrees with the Court’s reasoning, arguing that authorization should be viewed as an affirmative defense where the burden of persuasion rests on the defendant to prove good faith.

According to Dan Martin JD, a partner in Jones Walker’s Litigation Practice Group, article, “Federal agencies using generative AI(Artificial Intelligence), computer data analytics to search for Health Care Fraud,” Medical Economics Sept.12, 2023: “Data analytics is a good tool to suggest the need for further investigation, but it should not be used to determine misconduct conclusively.

The Department of Justice and Health and Human Services boast a yield of $4 or greater return on investment for every $1 spent on Health Care Fraud (HCF) detection and enforcement. They point specifically to their reliance on data analytics as a key driver of this return.”

However failure to discuss the disease and Disease state pathology demonstrates Law Enforcement and Prosecutors as completely fraudulent.

The pharmacology and unique properties of each opioid and patient individuality must be considered when a therapeutic opioid conversion is contemplated. Conversion should not simply rely on a mathematical formula embedded within the questionable CDC guidelines.

!!THE METABOLITE ERROR!!

This study investigates the presence of hydrocodone and its metabolite, hydromorphone, in urine samples of patients prescribed only oxycodone. The research aims to determine if the ratio of hydrocodone/hydromorphone to oxycodone can differentiate between patients taking only oxycodone (where hydrocodone/hydromorphone presence would likely be due to impurities in the oxycodone formulation) and those using other opioids in addition to oxycodone.

The study found that hydrocodone and/or hydromorphone are detectable in patients taking only oxycodone and can likely be identified as an impurity if their calculated ratio to oxycodone is <1 %.

The authors conclude that using these ratios can aid in the accurate interpretation of urine drug testing (UDT) results and prevent inappropriate actions based on the detection of trace opioid levels. They recommend further validation with a larger sample size.

Urinary Drug Testing, (UDT) is a key tool for monitoring patient compliance with prescribed opioid therapy and detecting the use of non-prescribed or illicit substances. However, interpreting UDT results can be complicated due to factors like the availability of different testing methods (immunoassays vs. mass spectrometry), individual differences in drug metabolism, and the presence of drug impurities in pharmaceutical preparations. Incorrect interpretation can lead to patients being denied necessary pain medication. Hydrocodone can be present as an impurity (up to 1%) in oxycodone pills.

Hydromorphone, a metabolite of hydrocodone, can also be detected in these patients. Distinguishing between hydromorphone resulting from the metabolism of this hydrocodone impurity and hydromorphone from other sources (suggesting non-compliance) is crucial.

This study is one of the first to highlight the detection of trace levels of hydromorphone as a metabolite of a hydrocodone impurity in prescribed oxycodone.

This work helps raise awareness that not only hydrocodone but also its metabolite, hydromorphone, can be detected in urine samples from patients taking only oxycodone.

The research proposes calculating hydrocodone and hydromorphone to oxycodone ratios to aid in determining if detectable levels are due to impurities from the pharmaceutical preparation.

Laboratories should consider the possibility of detecting both hydrocodone and hydromorphone in patients taking only oxycodone. Calculating the ratio of hydrocodone and hydromorphone to oxycodone is recommended to determine if the detected substances originate from the impurity in the oxycodone medication.

Samples with oxycodone concentrations above the analytical measurement range (AMR) with detectable hydromorphone or hydrocodone should be diluted and rerun to get an accurate concentration to calculate ratios.

Qlarant’s algorithms, marketed as tools to combat healthcare fraud, are instead perpetuating a system of tyranny that disproportionately targets Black and Brown healthcare professionals, echoing the historical persecution of thinkers like Giordano Bruno and Galileo Galilei.

RIFAI v. USA: MOTION FOR SANCTIONS, LITIGATION FEES, AND EXPUNGEMENT (A PODCAST ANALYSIS & REVIEW)

This article has more than demonstrated that our work has been done correctly and that Medical professionals in the US, with ongoing concerns about the supply chain and the need for further international cooperation, were never the causative factor of the so-called opioid crisis and the DOJ-DEA was well aware of those facts and willfully chose to ignore these finding.

Simply because they also know medical providers don’t they didn’t have M-60 Machine Guns, Rx9 missiles, Submarines, or rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and are much easier enforcement targets with more excellent assets available for civil forfeiture providing much safer career rewards for both Agents and prosecutors.  

Dr. Jeffrey Singer, a Cato Institute scholar, refutes President Trump’s claim of 300,000 fentanyl overdose deaths, citing the CDC’s lower figure of nearly 60,000.  “Now we are seeing more dangerous forms of fentanyl, like the elephant tranquilizer carfentanil, as well as other synthetic opioids like nitazenes, detected in overdose toxicology reports and DEA drug seizures.”

He argues that the inflated number promotes ineffective, fear-based policies.  Singer contends “that decades of drug war strategies have only relocated fentanyl production, leading to more potent and dangerous substances.” 

THE DEA IS AT FAULT FOR ILLEGAL HEROIN PRODUCTION, AND PHYSICIANS, PHARMACISTS AND DENTISTS WERE WRONGFULLY TARGETED VICTIMS OF THE SO CALLED OPIOID CRISIS ACTS OF JUDICIAL CORRUPTION

Success in combating the opioid-acetyl fentanyl crisis is not measured by a decline in deaths but by a slowing in the rate of increase in fatalities. For more than a decade, the US and international public has been hearing that prescription opioid pain relievers are always and forever a “BAD THING” — and that doctors and Big Pharma companies are supposedly responsible for an epidemic of addiction and drug overdose-related deaths.

SCAPEGOATING RACISM AND THE UGLY SIDE OF THE WAR ON DRUGS

The War on Drugs and Its Failure: The Caste criticizes the “War on Drugs” as a failed strategy that has shifted focus from drug cartels and street dealers to pharmaceutical companies and healthcare providers. Wilkerson, wants us to see America’s enduring resistance to Black equality through the prism of the caste system of India.

Predictive policing utilizes machine learning models, neural networks, and other AI-driven techniques to identify “high-crime” areas, which overwhelmingly correlate with historically over-policed Black and Brown neighborhoods.

The legal class, encompassing police departments, prosecutors, private attorneys, and the judiciary, has reaped enormous financial benefits from this AI-driven system.

Artificial intelligence algorithms using logistic regression, support vector machines (SVMs), and neural networks have been trained on biased datasets, reinforcing racial profiling.

PREDICTIVE POLICING UNEQUAL ENFORCEMENT

Matthew Fogg, a former DEA agent recounts his experiences within the agency, highlighting a perceived disparity in drug law enforcement. Fogg notes how his early experiences with law enforcement instilled a desire to serve. Fogg, became a supervisor for the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), where he was cross-designated, allowing him to act as both a U.S. Marshal and a special agent for the DEA. This dual tasking provided him with the authority to work in both roles simultaneously. 

He recalls becoming part of a specialized drug task force and being nicknamed “Batman.” 

I’M BATMAN

The nickname “Batman” was given to the individual because of his and his team’s aggressive and swift tactics in conducting drug raids. They described themselves as “swooping down on folks” across the country, using war-like attack tactics similar to those used in Vietnam, leading to the association with the vigilante superhero persona. He questioned the focus on urban areas, suggesting that drug use was prevalent in wealthier, predominantly white communities as well. 

His superior allegedly admitted that targeting those communities would bring unwanted scrutiny and jeopardize funding. The agent concludes that the war on drugs is racially biased and that equal enforcement would have led to different outcomes.

By directing disproportionate law enforcement resources to these areas, officials create a self-fulfilling prophecy where more arrests and citations lead to an apparent justification for further policing, reinforcing the cycle of criminalization.

Asset forfeiture laws have allowed law enforcement agencies to seize property and funds from residents, often without due process, turning police forces into revenue-generating entities. Additionally, the mass arrests facilitated by predictive policing have fueled a for-profit legal apparatus, sustaining bail bondsmen, court fees, and private prison contracts.

THE STRUCTURAL NAIVENESS OF U.S. Supreme Court JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS

In a secondary line of analysis, she notes that the Nazis’ anti-Semitic regime borrowed ideas and practices from the legal structures created in the Jim Crow South and invites us to see, in some of the horrors of the Holocaust, echoes of America’s caste order.

This shift, it argues, has led to the unjust criminalization of doctors who prescribe opioid medications for legitimate pain management purposes. These data-driven approaches, justified as crime prevention, have instead functioned as tools for wealth extraction, enriching the legal class structure at the expense of marginalized populations.

“Since the “War On Drugs” was a total failure, the government had to devise a new strategy to save their jobs.”

WE’VE BEEN HAD, BAMBOOZLED, LED ASTRY BY MEDIA AND THOSE WITH OTHER ECONOMIC INTEREST

A 2005 Ronald T. Libby examines the undertreatment of chronic pain in the United States, a problem exacerbated by the Drug Enforcement Agency’s (DEA) aggressive crackdown on doctors prescribing opioid painkillers. Libby argues that the DEA’s actions, fueled by exaggerated media reports and flawed data, have created an environment of fear that prevents physicians from adequately treating pain, harming patients and potentially leading to increased suffering and death.

The report concludes that the DEA’s war on pain doctors is an “aggressive, intemperate, unjustified” campaign that resembles the early 20th century’s attacks on doctors who treated addicts. It argues that the DEA is scapegoating doctors for the failures of the drug war, using flawed data and sensationalized media coverage to justify its actions.

This has created a dangerous situation for legitimate pain patients, who are finding it increasingly difficult to obtain adequate treatment, and is driving doctors out of this necessary field of medicine.

This Cato Institute policy analysis paper by Ronald T. Libby examines the detrimental effects of the Drug Enforcement Administration’s (DEA) aggressive crackdown on prescription painkillers, particularly OxyContin. The paper argues that the DEA’s actions, fueled by media exaggeration and flawed data, have led to the undertreatment of chronic pain by scaring physicians away from prescribing opioids.

Libby highlights the crucial distinction between addiction and physical dependence, arguing that the DEA’s approach conflates the two, resulting in unjust prosecutions of doctors and severe hardship for patients.

The paper further criticizes the DEA’s methods, including its reliance on questionable data and aggressive investigative tactics that harm the doctor-patient relationship. Finally, the report suggests that the DEA should focus on addressing the black market distribution of drugs rather than prosecuting physicians.

WHAT HAPPENED TO OPIUM PRODUCTION AFTER THE US INVASION IN 2001?

The government claims CVS knowingly prioritized profits over patient safety, creating unsafe working conditions that led to pharmacists filling prescriptions without proper due diligence.  This is a consolidated complaint filed by the United States against CVS Pharmacy and its subsidiaries.  

The provided text centers on a nationwide lawsuit against CVS Pharmacy. The suit alleges that the company knowingly dispensed controlled substances illegally, violating the Controlled Substances Act and the False Claims Act. It seeks substantial civil penalties, injunctive relief to prevent future violations, and restitution for funds improperly obtained from federal healthcare programs. 

“…Afghanistan, historically the leading source of the world’s illegal opium, is on-track for an unprecedented second year of dramatically reduced poppy cultivation, reflecting the Taliban regime’s continuing prohibition against growing the raw material for opiates…

…The crackdown has won plaudits in international circles, but its full implications call for clear-eyed analysis and well considered responses by the U.S. and others. The ban has deepened the poverty of millions of rural Afghans who depended on the crop for their livelihoods, yet done nothing to diminish opiate exports, as wealthier landowners sell off inventories…

…The unfortunate reality is that any aid mobilized to offset harm from the ban will be grossly insufficient and ultimately wasted unless it fosters broad- based rural and agricultural development that benefits the most affected poorer households…” 

🐀 🐀🐀🐀🐀🐀🐀

🐀🐀🐀

The Great King Rat: Dr. Timothy King and DOJ Deceptions

The article from youarewithinthenorms.com accuses Dr. Timothy King of providing false expert testimony in opioid-related cases. It alleges that Dr. King, dubbed the “Rat King,” has unfairly targeted healthcare professionals, leading to unjust convictions and suffering. 

The article claims his testimony is biased and based on flawed science. It also suggests potential conflicts of interest due to his patented system for assessing opioid prescriptions. 

The source further argues that this alleged misconduct stems from a corrupt alliance between healthcare insurance companies and unscrupulous physicians. Ultimately, the article calls for transparency and accountability in the use of expert witnesses in opioid litigation.

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REFERENCES:

background

From Libby Report 2005: The DEA came under heavy criticism from Congress because there was no “measurable proof” that it had reduced the illegal drug supply in the country.

In 2000 and 2001, the Department of Justice, which administers the DEA, gave the agency a highly critical rebuke and asserted that the Drug Enforcement Agency’s goals were not consistent with the president’s federal National Drug Control Strategy.

The DEA would need to find a new front for the War on Drugs, one that could produce tangible, measurable results.  The Controlled Substances Act empowered the DEA to regulate all pharmaceutical drugs.

In 2002, Glen A. Fine, Inspector General of the Department of Justice, asked why the DEA wasn’t doing more to combat prescription drug abuse when it was “a problem equal to cocaine.”

The DEA would need to find a new front for the War on Drugs, one that could produce tangible, measurable results (1) However, this situation has raised ethical and security concerns, prompting calls for increased regulation and oversight in developing and deploying artificial intelligence systems.

This report critically analyzes the DEA’s actions, raising serious concerns about the agency’s methods, motivations, and impact on pain management in the United States. It suggests a significant need for reform in how prescription drug abuse is addressed to ensure that the war on drugs does not further victimize legitimate pain patients.

The report also details the history of opioid regulation, highlighting the parallels between the current situation and the controversial Harrison Act of 1914, stating This report critiques the Drug Enforcement Administration’s (DEA) shift in focus from illicit street drugs to prescription painkillers, arguing that the agency’s aggressive tactics are harming legitimate pain patients and driving doctors out of pain management.

The report argues that the DEA’s actions are reminiscent of the early 20th century’s crackdown on doctors who prescribed narcotics to addicts and that the DEA is using flawed data and sensationalized media narratives to justify their actions. The report argues the DEA is more focused on revenue than public health and that their practices have created a dangerous chilling effect on the adequate treatment of pain.

Finally, it critiques the DEA’s methods, arguing that their focus on easily targeted doctors has distracted them from more effective ways to address prescription drug diversion.

This 2005 REPORT UNRAVELS THE CLAIM THAT physicians prescribing Oxycontin were the precipitating factor of the Opioid Crisis.

Instead, as we are learning, The Wars in Afghanistan notably u.s. backed Afghanistan government corruption along with the policy failure of U.S. Government Agency such as the DOJ and State Department’s failure of coordinated policy mix signals it argues, and was driven by federal law enforcement agencies such as D.E.A. squandering more than 8 billion dollars in poppy eradication funding in Afghanistan.

These failures led to them seeking out medical providers as they were easier enforcement targets to justify their existence rather than address the root causes of the opioid crisis which U.S. Foreign Policy in Afghanistan which precipated the world wide illicit fentanyl crisis we have today as factor in this trade war.

According to both Ronald Libby in 2005 and Dr. Jeffery Singer 2019 through 2025 reports from the Cato Institute, “Doctors who prescribed these medications were now portrayed as street drug dealers and distributors of this medication to the public. Finally, the government had a new target to use in its failed “war on drugs.”

The Suffering of Chronic Pain Patients: The source emphasizes the devastating consequences for patients with chronic pain who are denied access to essential medications. It highlights cases of patients forced to turn to the streets for relief, leading to overdoses and death, while others have resorted to suicide due to unbearable suffering.

“Chronic pain patients denied their life-saving medication went to the streets for relief, overdosed, and died. Other chronic pain patients committed suicide.

D.E.A.’s DEFective Enforcement of Drug laws and whose violation went unpunished

This Cato Institute policy analysis paper by Ronald T. Libby examines the detrimental effects of the Drug Enforcement Administration’s (DEA) aggressive crackdown on prescription painkillers, particularly OxyContin. The paper argues that the DEA’s actions, fueled by media exaggeration and flawed data, have led to the undertreatment of chronic pain by scaring physicians away from prescribing opioids. Libby highlights the crucial distinction between addiction and physical dependence, arguing that the DEA’s approach conflates the two, resulting in unjust prosecutions of doctors and severe hardship for patients. The paper further criticizes the DEA’s methods, including its reliance on questionable data and aggressive investigative tactics that harm the doctor-patient relationship. Finally, the report suggests that the DEA should focus on addressing the black market distribution of drugs rather than prosecuting physicians.

However, This January 2024 Department of Defense Inspector General report investigates irregularities within the White House Medical Unit and other National Capital Region executive medicine facilities. The investigation uncovered serious issues regarding pharmaceutical management and patient eligibility, including improper dispensing of medications, inadequate oversight, and provision of care to ineligible individuals. These practices violated federal law, DoD policy, and internal controls. The report concludes with recommendations for improved policy and oversight to address the identified problems, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs agreed with all recommendations. The investigation spanned several years and included interviews with numerous officials and a review of extensive documentation.

The DoD OIG report uncovered serious deficiencies in the pharmaceutical management and patient eligibility practices within the WHMU, coupled with inadequate oversight from the DHA and Service Surgeons General. The lack of adherence to established guidelines and regulations poses significant risks to patient safety, increases the potential for drug diversion, and puts the MHS at risk of misallocation of resources. The report’s recommendations, if implemented effectively, aim to address these issues and improve the overall governance and accountability of executive medicine services within the NCR.

• WHMU Pharmaceutical Management DeficienciesThe WHMU’s pharmaceutical practices were found to be severely deficient, lacking compliance with federal and DoD guidance.
• Unlike other NCR executive medicine clinics that rely on full MTF pharmacies, the WHMU handled the entire scope of pharmacy operations, including procurement, storage, dispensing, and disposal, without proper external accreditation or oversight.
• “Conversely, the White House Medical Unit’s pharmaceutical services included the full scope of pharmacy operations, including storage and inventory, prescribing and dispensing, procurement, and disposal, and was not credentialed by any outside agency.”
• Specific Deficiencies:Prescribing: Prescriptions for controlled substances frequently lacked required patient and provider information, violating DEA policy.
• “White House Medical Unit medical providers wrote prescriptions for controlled substances that often lacked the medical provider and patient information mandated by DEA policy.”
• Dispensing: Medications, including controlled substances like Ambien and Provigil, were dispensed without proper identity verification. Over-the-counter medications were left in open bins.
• “The White House Medical Unit dispensed non‑emergency controlled medications, such as Ambien and Provigil, without verifying the patient’s identity. The White House Medical Unit also left over‑the‑counter medications in open bins for patient retrieval and use.”
• Storage and Inventory: Record-keeping for controlled substances was inadequate, and the unit did not consistently adhere to requirements for secure storage.
• Procurement: The WHMU was found to purchase brand-name medications instead of generic equivalents, increasing costs and the risk of drug diversion.
• “Additionally, the White House Medical Unit’s pharmaceutical management practices ineffectively used DoD funds to purchase brand‑name medications instead of generic equivalents; this increased the risk for the diversion of controlled substances by not accounting for them appropriately.”
• Disposal: Improper disposal of medications, including controlled substances in sharps containers, did not adhere to DEA and Navy policies, creating a diversion risk.
• “The disposal of controlled substances in sharps containers does not meet the DEA requirement for rendering a substance non‑retrievable…”
• Finding B: Patient Eligibility IssuesThe WHMU dispensed medications, including controlled substances, to individuals who were not eligible for care under Military Health System (MHS) guidelines.
• “The White House Medical Unit dispensed prescription medications, including controlled substances, to ineligible White House staff.”
• The WHMU did not upload non-DoD beneficiary medical records into MHS databases, obscuring the visibility of medical care provided and associated costs.
• The WHMU used practices like “health care by proxy” to justify dispensing medications to ineligible personnel.
• Many staff members expressed concerns about the unit’s eligibility practices but were dismissed by senior leadership.
• “Several former White House Medical Unit staff members questioned the unit’s historical patient eligibility practices; however, White House Medical Unit senior leaders did not address the concerns.”
• Finding C: Lack of Oversight and GuidanceThe Defense Health Agency (DHA) did not establish policies, procedures, or guidance for executive medicine services within the National Capital Region Medical Directorate (NCRMD).
• “The Defense Health Agency Did Not Establish Policies, Procedures, and Guidance for Executive Medicine Services Within the National Capital Region Medical Directorate.”
• The NCRMD’s executive medicine facilities had inconsistent eligibility criteria, leading to varied enrollment practices across different facilities.
• Neither the DHA nor the Service Surgeons General provided oversight of the WHMU’s pharmacy operations or patient eligibility practices.
• “Senior MHS leaders that we interviewed stated that the White House Medical Unit’s clinical and pharmaceutical operations lacked oversight by the MHS. Specifically, these senior leaders could not identify the MHS component responsible for oversight of the White House Medical Unit.”
• Due to limitations in its patient administration system, the MHS was not able to bill for outpatient medical services to some senior U.S. Government officials.
• “Due to Walter Reed’s patient administration system not being able to bill for outpatient medical services rendered to senior U.S. Government officials, the MHS may have inappropriately provided free outpatient medical care.”

3. Systemic Problems and Risks

• Diversion Risk: The lack of proper control of controlled substances at the WHMU presented a high risk of diversion.
• “The White House Medical Unit’s pharmaceutical management practices did not meet the intent of Federal and DoD guidance. Additionally, the White House Medical Unit did not implement pharmaceutical management processes to deter the risk of diversion.”
• Patient Safety: The WHMU’s practices lacked essential safety checks, such as a pharmacist review of prescriptions and medication handling, increasing the risk of medication errors.

REFERENCES:

U.S. Counternarcotics in Afghanistan: A Critical Analysis

Our counterarguments criticize the government’s approach to the opioid crisis, citing flawed data, algorithmic bias in enforcement, and unduly restrictive policies harming patients and physicians.

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) analyzes the U.S. counternarcotics effort in Afghanistan from 2002-2017 and outlines US support for drug traffickers in Afghanistan going back to the 1980s during the Soviet occupation.

The US covertly funded and armed Mujahideen to fight the Soviets, many of whom were also heavily involved in the drug trade. These warlords, such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Nasim Akhun, received significant DEA support and later transformed Afghanistan into a central poppy-growing region. This created a narco-state supported by the DEA. 

The report details four main approaches: interdiction, eradication, alternative development, and political support building.  SIGAR found these efforts largely unsuccessful, citing a lack of coordination, insufficient alternative livelihoods, and flawed data as major contributing factors. The report concludes with thirteen evidence-based recommendations for improving future counternarcotics strategies, emphasizing better data, local context consideration, and interagency collaboration. 

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ROLE IN THE AFGHAN OPIUM TRADE

Date: October 26, 2023 Subject: Analysis of Seth Harp Interview on U.S. Involvement in Afghan Opium Production. 

The heroin produced there subsequently flooded the US market, creating a domestic crisis to which the DEA denies any connection. This highlights that the US government is potentially choosing “winners and losers” in the drug trade. Alternative livelihood programs aimed to incentivize farmers to shift away from poppy cultivation by providing them with viable economic alternatives.

These programs included providing agricultural inputs like wheat seeds and fertilizer, promoting high-value crops, and supporting rural development initiatives. The success of these programs was mixed, as they often lacked coordination, faced security challenges, and struggled to compete with the profitability of opium poppy.

This Article more than demonstrates CVS, Doctors, and Prescription Drugs were never the cause of the DOJ-DEA Opioid Crisis. It summarizes the key arguments and facts presented by Seth Harp, a contributing editor at Rolling Stone and author of the forthcoming book “The Fort Bragg Cartel,” regarding the US role in the Afghan opium trade, particularly during the 2001-2021 US occupation of Afghanistan. 

Seth Harp’s interview presents a counter-narrative to the established understanding of the Afghan drug trade during the US presence, highlighting a potentially systematic US role in fostering the production and distribution of heroin for two decades. 

It challenges the commonly held belief that the Taliban, Medical Doctors, Dentists, Pharmacists, Nurse Practitioners, Drug manufacturers, CV S Pharmacy Health, Pronto Pharmacy et al., or Dr. Terence Sasaki, MD, Paul Volkman, MD., Dr. Gazelle Craig, DO., Dr Barbara Marino.MD., were responsible for the opioid/opium trade and suggests that the US-backed Afghan government, supported at every level by the US, was the world’s largest drug cartel. 

This analysis raises serious questions about US foreign policy, its motives, and the human costs of its actions. Harp’s forthcoming book is expected to delve into this further and provide a more complete picture of these issues. Harp’s analysis challenges conventional narratives and suggests a deep and sustained involvement by the US government and its allies in fostering and profiting from the opium trade, with significant consequences for both Afghanistan and the global drug market.

The interviewee emphasizes the scale of US-backed opium production and its contribution to the heroin crisis in the US and other countries. He concludes by questioning the US government’s contradictory stance on anti-drug policies and its apparent support for certain actors in the global drug trade.

Quiz

Study Guide: The Fentanyl Crisis and International Relations

Instructions: Answer each question in 2-3 sentences.

1. According to the article, what specific actions did President Trump take regarding trade in response to the fentanyl crisis?
2. What are the main chemicals that China is exporting that are related to the fentanyl crisis, and why is this significant?
3. Why was China outraged by the actions of the Trump administration? How did this impact anti-drug cooperation between the two nations?
4. How did President Trump claim that the Biden administration failed to address the fentanyl crisis?
5. What does the article suggest is the primary reason for China’s lack of complete cooperation in stopping the export of fentanyl precursors?
6. How does China’s internal approach to drug control differ from its approach to the drug trade directed toward other nations?
7. According to the article, what evidence shows that fentanyl precursors are still readily available despite China’s attempts to control them?
8. What does Vanda Felbab-Brown suggest that the US could offer China to encourage further cooperation in combating the fentanyl trade?
9. Why does the article suggest that even if China fully cooperated, it would be difficult to eradicate the fentanyl supply chain?
10. According to the article, what is considered “success” in combating the opioid crisis in America?

Conclusion:

The opioid acty-fentanyl crisis is a major international problem that requires a multi-faceted approach. The current US strategy of tariffs and accusations is likely counterproductive, further straining relationships and hindering cooperation. While China is a key player in the precursor supply chain, cooperation, rather than confrontation, might be the most effective path toward curbing the crisis. The problem is complex, with a resilient chemical industry and transnational crime networks. However, the articles also offer potential solutions through bilateral cooperation and a focus on reputation.

This briefing highlights the complexity of the problem and the need for a more nuanced approach, moving beyond a simplistic trade war. It also notes that the death rate continues to climb, even as the rate of increase may be slowing. This suggests that the problem is not being solved and the methods must be reviewed and re-evaluated.