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NORMAN J CLEMENT RPH., DDS, NORMAN L. CLEMENT PHARM-TECH, MALACHI F. MACKANDAL PHARMD, IN THE SPIRIT OF WALTER R. CLEMENT MS., MBA., BELINDA BROWN-PARKER, IN THE SPIRIT OF JOSEPH SOLVO ESQ., IN THE SPIRIT OF REV. C.T. VIVIAN, JELANI ZIMBABWE CLEMENT, BS., MBA., IN THE SPIRIT OF WILLIE GUINYARD BS., IN THE SPIRIT OF ERLIN CLEMENT SR., JOSEPH WEBSTER MD., MBA, IN THE SPIRIT OF RICHARD KAUL, MD., BEVERLY C. PRINCE MD., FACS., IN THE SPIRIT OF LEROY BAYLOR, JAY K. JOSHI MD., MBA, ADRIENNE EDMUNDSON, IN THE SPIRIT OF WALTER F. WRENN III, MD., ESTER HYATT PH.D., WALTER L. SMITH BS., IN THE SPIRIT OF BRAHM FISHER ESQ., MICHELE ALEXANDER MD., CUDJOE WILDING BS, MARTIN NDJOU, BS., RPH., IN THE SPIRIT OF DEBRA LYNN SHEPHERD, BERES E. MUSCHETT, STRATEGIC ADVISORS



PBMs’, THE MIDDLEMAN CUTS OPERATING IN THE SHADOWS OF YOUR HEALTH PLAN

The Intermediary Positioning: Analyzing the PBM’s Role in Healthcare Ecosystems
The Pharmacy Benefit Manager (PBM) has strategically entrenched itself as a self-appointed gatekeeper, operating within the critical friction points between health insurance plan sponsors, patients, and pharmacists. Originally conceived to provide Administrative Services Only (ASO) to streamline claims, these entities have transitioned into aggressive middlemen.

For the health plan sponsor, recognizing this intermediary positioning is the first step in identifying systemic financial leakages. By obstructing the direct relationship between the payer and the provider, the PBM creates a controlled environment where value is diverted away from the plan and into the PBM’s proprietary accounts.

The current power dynamic allows the PBM to “call the shots” regarding medication access, fundamentally dictating the “when, where, and how” of prescription fulfillment.

This absolute control over pharmacy network adequacy and formulary access subverts the sponsor’s primary objective of sustainable cost reduction. Rather than serving as a neutral administrator, the PBM leverages its gatekeeper status to prioritize internal profit margins over the plan’s fiscal integrity or beneficiaries’ clinical outcomes.
The PBM’s interference manifests as a direct conflict of interest across three primary stakeholder groups:
- Sponsors (Employers): PBMs manipulate the benefit design to maximize their own revenue, often failing to deliver promised savings while charging the sponsor a significant premium over the actual cost of the drug.
- Patients: Through restricted formularies and mandated provider channels, PBMs strip patients of autonomy, limiting access to essential medications based on the PBM’s financial incentives.
- Pharmacists: Independent pharmacists are systematically “cut out” or marginalized as PBMs utilize their market power to redirect volume toward PBM-owned entities, eroding local pharmacy network stability.
Beyond these structural barriers, we must examine the specific accounting maneuvers—most notably non-transparent spread revenue—used to divert plan assets into PBM coffers.

The Mechanics of Spread Pricing: Deconstructing the “Script Scam”
There has been a calculated strategic shift in the PBM business model, moving away from transparent fee-for-service arrangements toward a “Principal-based” profit model. In this evolution, PBMs have largely abandoned their role as simple paperwork processors in favor of opaque pricing structures designed to generate arbitrage opportunities.
The cornerstone of this model is what the industry colloquially refers to as the “script scam,” or spread pricing.

In this maneuver, the PBM charges the insurance plan a high premium for a medication while simultaneously reimbursing the dispensing pharmacy at a significantly lower rate. The PBM then retains the difference—the “spread”—as undisclosed revenue. This “shady scheme” ensures that the PBM profits from every transaction, effectively marking up medications and pocketing the delta without the sponsor’s knowledge or consent.
| PBM Stated Value Proposition | Actual Fiscal Outcome (Auditor Analysis) |
| Cost Containment: Negotiating lower drug prices for the plan. | Reimbursement Spread Retention: Retaining the undisclosed invoice-to-claim delta as internal profit. |
| Administrative Support: Providing back-end processing for claims. | Principal-Based Arbitrage: Utilizing the “script scam” to facilitate hidden markups on essential medications. |
These hidden markups significantly distort pharmaceutical market transparency, as the true cost of the drug is obscured by the PBM’s desire to accumulate internal capital.

Manufacturer Rebates and the Distortion of Formulary Selection

The strategic implications of PBMs negotiating directly with “Big Brand” pharmaceutical manufacturers are profound, often resulting in a direct violation of fiduciary misalignment. These negotiations are not aimed at clinical efficacy but at securing “sweet deals” where manufacturers pay the PBM to grant “favored” status to high-cost medications over more affordable, clinically equivalent alternatives.

This “pay-to-play” system incentivizes PBMs to build formularies based on rebate aggregation potential rather than the sponsor’s cost-effectiveness goals.

When a PBM prioritizes a brand-name drug because it offers a higher back-end payment, the plan sponsor is forced to pay higher upfront costs, while the PBM secures the rebate as “other revenue.”
The consequences of these manufacturer-PBM deals include:
- Erosion of Clinical Neutrality: Patient drug choices are restricted to medications that maximize PBM profit rather than patient health.
- Inflated Plan Costs: The preference for high-cost “rebate-heavy” drugs artificially inflates the sponsor’s total spend and drives up insurance premiums.
- Formulary Exclusion Risks: Low-cost generics are often excluded or placed on high-cost tiers to protect the PBM’s “sweet deals” with brand manufacturers.
These financial incentives naturally drive the push toward PBM-owned service channels, where the PBM can capture both the spread and the rebate in a closed-loop system.

Vertical Integration: The Fiscal Impact of Mandated Mail-Order Services
PBMs have aggressively pursued vertical integration, owning the pharmacies they are supposedly managing objectively. This creates a monopolistic feedback loop that eliminates competition from independent neighborhood pharmacies. By mandating the use of PBM-owned mail-order services, these intermediaries ensure they capture every dollar of the transaction—from the administrative fee to the pharmacy’s professional margin.

The removal of the “neighborhood pharmacist” from the care continuum through forced mail-order creates several critical risks:
- Service Level Degradation (“Lousy Service”): Patients are forced away from personalized local care and into centralized, automated systems that frequently suffer from delivery delays and poor customer support.
- Anti-Competitive Choice Restriction: The PBM “calls the shots” by stripping the patient of pharmacy choice, forcing them into a proprietary channel that the PBM manages for its own benefit.
- Aggressive Capital Extraction (“Huge Piles of Cash”): By owning the mail-order channel, the PBM can rake in massive profits without the pricing pressure of a competitive retail network.

Plan sponsors are often left with zero visibility into these integrated operations, as PBMs use their ownership status to shield their internal margins from audit or scrutiny.

Transparency and the “Shadow” Economy of Pharmacy Benefits
Transparency is the bedrock of fiduciary management, yet PBMs strategically “prefer to work in the shadows.” This lack of visibility is the core component of a business model built on information asymmetry. By keeping sponsors, pharmacists, and patients “in the dark,” PBMs protect their ability to execute “shady schemes” that would not survive the light of a rigorous audit.

Risk Summary and Fiduciary Warning: Health plan sponsors face extreme fiscal and legal risk by failing to audit their PBMs’ profit-taking methods. Under ERISA guidelines, sponsors have a fiduciary duty to manage plan assets solely for the benefit of participants. Allowing a PBM to “rake in profits” through non-transparent spread pricing and rebate retention while remaining “in the dark” may constitute a breach of that fiduciary duty.

The current PBM model relies on stakeholders remaining unaware of the financial mechanisms at play. For plan sponsors seeking to reclaim control, protect patient choice, and restore fiscal integrity, the first step is a comprehensive audit of all PBM contracts and a transition to transparent, pass-through models.

For more information on reforming these practices and identifying who is truly managing your pharmacy spend, visit who runs your drug plan. The era of the “shadow” middleman must end to ensure the long-term viability of the healthcare ecosystem.

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